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1. 
Argument 
Mr. Edgar's counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony 
about Mr. Edgar knowing drug dealers. 
Mr. Edgar's attorney was ineffective when he did not object to testimony 
that Mr. Edgar knew drug dealers. That testimony did not help the jury determine 
who possessed the drugs found in the car, because there was absolutely no 
evidence that the drug dealers were connected at all with the charged crime. 
Instead, what the challenged testimony did was raise the impermissible inference 
that because Mr. Edgar knew some drug dealers, he must be a drug dealer, too. 
The State's arguments to the contrary do not change the baseline problem: 
that the testimony did not shed any light on what happened the evening Mr. Edgar 
was arrested and instead implied guilt by association. The State argues that the 
testimony that Mr. Edgar knew other drug dealers was probative of who owned 
the drugs in the vehicle. The State points to United States v. Haynes, where a 
defendant was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine; the district court 
held that evidence that the defendant knew a person who manufactured 
methamphetamine using a unique method was admissible because it showed that 
the defendant was aware that the method could be used to manufacture 
methamphetamine and explained the various items in the defendant's possession. 
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372 F.3d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir. 2004). But this argument does not advance the State's 
case. 
Haynes involved charges that the defendant attempted to manufacture 
drugs through a unique manufacturing process, so the fact that the defendant 
knew about that drug manufacturing process was probative. Here, however, the 
drugs found in the vehicle were not unique or different. The drugs were not 
marked in a unique way, packaged peculiarly, or handled in any way differently 
than ordinary drugs. There was no evidence that the drug dealers were tied in any 
way to the charged crime. In fact, one of the drug dealers dealt heroin specifically, 
and the police found no heroin in the vehicle or in Mr. Edgar's house. (See R. 471-
86, 593.) 
The State also argues that Mr. Edgar's admission that he knew drug dealers 
was probative because it was a tacit admission of guilt. But the State's reasoning 
essentially is what Rule 403 prohibits: because Mr. Edgar knows drug dealers, he 
must be one himself. See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 741-42 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (reasoning that "guilt by association" evidence is "irrelevant to the 
question of a defendant's actual guilt" and is not probative; consequently, 
evidence that a defendant "knew a criminal" should have been excluded); United 
States v. Marshall, 173 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 1999) (excluding evidence that 
"tended to establish guilt by association-because [the defendants] cavorted with 
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drug dealers, they must be drug dealers themselves"). Mr. Edgar's attorney should 
have known the prejudicial nature of the testimony and objected it to. 
Contrary to the State's argument, Mr. Edgar was prejudiced by his 
attorney's failure to object. The admission of the evidence was harmful to Mr. 
Edgar because the evidence against him was not overwhelming. The police found 
drugs in Mr. Edgar's wife's vehicle after the vehicle left Mr. Edgar's home. But Mr. 
Edgar was not in the vehicle when the police found the drugs, and no officer saw 
Mr. Edgar get in the vehicle, even though the officers were surveilling Mr. Edgar's 
home. (R. 451-52, 546-57, 526.) The police did find drugs on the passenger in the 
vehicle, Ms. Marsh. (R. 456-58.) Mr. Edgar never gave the police the combination 
to the safe in the vehicle that contained drugs. A detective at trial testified that Mr. 
Edgar said that the drugs were not his wife's; they were his. But Mr. Edgar was 
merely protecting his wife, who was found in the vehicle with the drugs. 
2. Mr. Edgar's counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
prosecutor's misstatement in closing argument. 
Mr. Edgar's trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to the 
prosecutor's comment in his closing statement that Mr. Edgar was "moving tons 
of weight, pounds of heroin." (R. 672-73.) That statement was not supported by 
evidence in the record, nor was it a reasonable inference from the evidence. What 
was in the record was Mr. Edgar's statement to the agent that he had access to 
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someone who could supply pounds of heroin, not that Mr. Edgar himself was 
moving pounds of heroin. (Compare Add. C., R. 593 with Add. D, R. 672.) In fact, the 
police found no heroin in the vehicle or in Mr. Edgar's house. Just because 
someone knows a heroin supplier does not mean that the person is a heroin 
supplier, especially a high-level supplier who is moving pounds of heroin into the 
area; that is prohibited guilt-by-association reasoning. United States v. Pritchett, 699 
F.2d 317, 319 (6th Cir. 1983) (reasoning that prosecutor's questioning about 
defendant's association with a drug dealer created the improper inference that 
"because [the defendant] maintained a relationship with a convicted cocaine 
dealer, [the defendant] himself was somehow prone to criminal activity of the 
same sort"). 
And Mr. Edgar would not have been prejudiced had his attorney objected 
and the prosecutor was forced to state the evidence accurately-that Mr. Edgar 
knew drug dealers, but there was no evidence that Mr. Edgar himself was moving 
pounds of heroin. The prosecutor's misstatement encouraged the jury to punish 
Mr. Edgar because he was a high-level heroin dealer, even though the police found 
no heroin in this case. It was an inflammatory misstatement of the evidence. And 
Mr. Edgar was prejudiced by his attorney's failure because, as argued above, the 
evidence against Mr. Edgar was not overwhelming. 
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3. This Court should grant Mr. Edgar's Rule 23B motion 
Concurrent with his opening brief, Mr. Edgar filed a Rule 23B motion 
arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to exclude plea negotiations 
between Mr. Edgar and a detective under Rule 410, but he needed this Court to 
remand the case to get all the necessary evidence on the record. 
In response, the State argues that Mr. Edgar's argument about his Rule 23B 
motion is improper because it references extra-record evidence. Yet the State's 
argument is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's September 2013 Revised Order 
Pertaining to Rule 23B. According to that order, if a Rule 23B motion is filed 
concurrently with the opening brief, "the briefs may reference the arguments in 
the motion and response, and the motion and response may reference the fact 
statement and arguments in the briefs. Affidavits submitted in support of Rule 23B 
motions are not part of the record on appeal and will be considered only to 
determine whether [to] grant or deny the motion." Under this rule, it is entirely 
appropriate for Mr. Edgar to reference the arguments he made in his Rule 23B 
motion in his opening brief. He submitted his affidavit to the Court so that the 
Court would more fully understand his argument; however, Mr. Edgar is very 
aware that his affidavit is extra-record evidence that this Court can only use in 
deciding whether to grant his motion. 
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Turning to the merits of the motion, at trial, a detective testified about 
conversations he had with Mr. Edgar, where Mr. Edgar gave him information 
about cooperating with law enforcement in exchange for leniency on his charges. 
The information Mr. Edgar gave to the detective should have been excluded 
under Utah R. Evid. 410 as a statement made in the course of a plea negotiation. 
Federal courts have realized that Rule 410 applies not only to statements made to 
prosecuting attorneys but to a government agent (in this case, the detective). 
United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 799 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. O'Neal, 
992 F.2d 1218, at *8 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished). 
The State argues that Mr. Edgar has not shown that his counsel was 
ineffective because the law Mr. Edgar relies on is not controlling. However, the 
advisory committee notes to Rule 410 specifically state that it is the "federal rule, 
verbatim." Utah R. Evid. 410 advisory comm. notes. And Utah courts have 
looked to federal courts in determining the contours of Rule 410. W. Valley City v. 
Fieeiki, 2007 Ut App 62, 1 20, 157 P.3d 802. Because Utah adopted the federal rule 
and looks to federal cases interpreting the rule, Mr. Edgar's attorney should have 
known that Rule 410 applies not only to prosecuting attorneys but also to 
government agents. 
6 
@ 
@ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Conclusion 
Mr. Edgar respectfully requests that this Court hold that his counsel was 
ineffective and vacate his convictions. 
DATED this 14th day of May, 2016. 
Emily Adfms (14937) 
ADAMS LEGAL LLC 
P.O. Box 1564 
Bountiful, UT 84011 
eadams@adamslegalllc.com 
(801) 309-9625 
Attonzey for Defendant/Appellant 
Michael Edgar 
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